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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
_____________ 
 
No. 12-3517 
_____________ 
  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
  
v. 
  
KAREEM SHABAZZ, 
                            Appellant  
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. Crim. Action No. 11-cr-0023) 
District Judge: Honorable James M. Munley 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
(Submitted: July 8, 2013) 
______________ 
 
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., SLOVITER, and BARRY, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed: August 8, 2013) 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 
Kareem Shabazz (“Shabazz”) appeals the District Court’s denial of his motion to 
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suppress evidence seized from a vehicle in which he was a passenger at the time of his 
arrest.  For the reasons below, we will affirm.   
I. BACKGROUND 
Because we write primarily for the benefit of the parties, we recount only the facts 
essential to our discussion.  On October 30, 2010, Shabazz and two other individuals, 
James Russell and Shaelyn Joy Davis (“Shay”), robbed a bank in Pennsylvania while 
brandishing guns.  Joseph Swerdon (“Swerdon”) and Kirk Robinson drove the getaway 
cars.  Law enforcement was initially unsuccessful in identifying the robbers. 
Two months later, Swerdon called a local Federal Bureau of Investigations office 
and voluntarily told agents that he had information about the bank robbery.  Swerdon 
provided the FBI with the names of the robbers and information about their roles, 
including his own.  More important, some of the facts Swerdon provided were details that 
had not been made public, supporting the veracity of his uncorroborated statements.   
As part of the ongoing investigation into the bank robbery, the FBI enlisted 
Swerdon’s cooperation.  Specifically, Swerdon participated in recorded phone calls with 
the other robbery conspirators, including Shabazz.  On December 28, 2010, Swerdon 
placed a recorded telephone call to Shabazz.  During this phone call, Shabazz and 
Swerdon discussed the bank robbery.  Later that day, FBI agents recorded a second phone 
conversation between Swerdon and Shabazz, during which they discussed the plan for an 
upcoming home invasion robbery.  They discussed specifics of the plan, including that 
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Swerdon would drive to New York to pick up Shabazz and that Shay would also 
participate in the robbery.  Swerdon also specifically asked Shabazz if he would be 
bringing “the ratchets” for the robbery, to which Shabazz replied, “We got everything on 
this end.”  (App. 90-91.)  On December 29, 2010, the agents recorded a conversation 
between Swerdon and Shay, in which they discussed the upcoming home robbery. 
Based on these conversations and with Swerdon’s cooperation, the agents 
developed a plan to arrest Shabazz after Swerdon picked him up for the home robbery.  
The agents arranged for FBI air and ground surveillance to follow Swerdon’s vehicle 
from Pennsylvania to New York, as well as on the return trip.  The agents also provided 
Swerdon with a body recorder, and instructed him to convince Shabazz to place any bags 
he possessed in the trunk of the car for safety reasons. 
On December 30, 2010, in accordance with the plan, Swerdon drove to New York 
to pick up Shabazz.  Swerdon called Shabazz twice to get directions to the house where 
Shabazz was and called the agents to inform them about the conversations.  Upon 
Swerdon’s arrival at the designated house, FBI air surveillance observed two unidentified 
black males exiting the house carrying bags.  One of the unidentified black males then 
placed the bags in the trunk of Swerdon’s car and entered the front passenger-side seat.  
Swerdon then began driving back to Pennsylvania.   
Once Swerdon crossed state lines, state police initiated a traffic stop of Swerdon’s 
car and arrested Shabazz.  After Shabazz was placed in restraints, agents opened the 
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trunk, searched the bags within, and found a short-barreled shotgun, shotgun shells, two 
handguns, a clip with bullets, and gloves, among other things. 
Shabazz was subsequently indicted for bank robbery, brandishing a firearm during 
a bank robbery, and for being a felon in possession of a firearm.  Shabazz filed a motion 
seeking to suppress the evidence from the bags seized from Swerdon’s vehicle.  The 
District Court held a suppression hearing.  Two FBI agents testified, and the recordings 
of the two December 28, 2010 phone conversations between Swerdon and Shabazz were 
played.  (App. 75, 84.)  One agent testified that “ratchets” is a term for guns, and that the 
agents listening to the recording interpreted the exchange to mean that Shabazz would 
bring firearms with him for use during the home robbery.  (App. 83.)  Shabazz proffered 
no evidence of his own.  The District Court denied the motion to suppress.  The District 
Court found: (1) Shabazz lacked standing to challenge the search of the bags, (2) 
assuming Shabazz had standing, the search of the bags was sound because Swerdon 
consented to the search, and (3) the search was sound as a search incident to lawful arrest. 
Following a jury trial, Shabazz was found guilty of all counts
1
 and was sentenced 
to life imprisonment.  Shabazz now appeals the denial of his motion to suppress. 
 
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
                                                 
1
 A superseding indictment added two additional charges against Shabazz: conspiracy to 
use a firearm during a bank robbery and transportation of firearms in interstate commerce 
for the purpose of committing a bank robbery.   
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The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have 
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
“On appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress, we review a district court’s 
factual findings for clear error, and we exercise de novo review over its application of the 
law to those factual findings.”  United States v. Pavulak, 700 F.3d 651, 660 (3d Cir. 
2012) (emphasis omitted).   
III. ANALYSIS 
 Shabazz objects to the District Court’s denial of his motion to suppress on several 
grounds.  Each argument fails.
2
   
                                                 
2
 We note at the onset that Shabazz does not appear to have challenged the District 
Court’s finding that the search and seizure of the bags was lawful on account of 
Swerdon’s consent, and thus, Shabazz may have waived this argument.  See United States 
v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 222 (3d Cir. 2005).  If we were to consider it, the District 
Court’s finding on consent would give us pause.  A consent is only a valid exception to 
the warrant and probable cause requirements if the person giving consent possesses 
authority over the item searched.  See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 
(1973); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974).  It is clear that Swerdon, as 
the driver and owner of the vehicle, had authority to consent to a full search of the 
vehicle, including the trunk.  See United States v. Morales, 861 F.2d 396, 399 (3d Cir. 
1988).  It is less clear that Swerdon had authority over the closed bags Shabazz placed in 
the trunk and thus, whether Swerdon could provide a valid consent to the search of those 
bags.  See Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740 (1969) (cousin’s consent to a search of 
defendant’s bag valid because the bag was used jointly by both men); United States v. 
Jaras, 86 F.3d 383, 389 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding that a driver of a vehicle had no 
authority to give consent to the search of passenger’s suitcases in the trunk); United 
States v. Welch, 4 F.3d 761, 764 (9th Cir. 1993) (boyfriend’s actual authority to consent 
to search of rental car did not extend to search of girlfriend’s purse located in trunk).  We 
need not address waiver or consent here because we will affirm the search on other 
grounds. 
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A.  Standing 
 Shabazz’s argument that the District Court erred in finding that he had no standing 
to challenge the search and seizure of the vehicle and the bags within is without merit.  
To establish standing, the individual challenging the search has the burden of establishing 
that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the property searched and the item 
seized.  Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 95-97 (1990).  Because Shabazz was not the 
owner of the vehicle but was merely a passenger, he had no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the vehicle and thus has no standing to contest its stop and subsequent search.  
See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148-49 (1978); see also United States v. Baker, 221 
F.3d 438, 441-42 (3d Cir. 2000).   Whether Shabazz had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the bags that were placed in the trunk may be a different question if Shabazz 
had claimed ownership or established a possessory interest in them.  See Bond v. United 
States, 529 U.S. 334, 338-39 (2000) (holding that a bus passenger maintains an 
expectation of privacy in luggage placed in an overhead compartment); United States v. 
Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (“[A] person possesses a privacy interest in the contents 
of personal luggage that is protected by the Fourth Amendment.”); see also United States 
v. Worthon, 520 F.3d 1173, 1182 (10th Cir. 2008) (suggesting that a passenger may have 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in bags in a car if he asserts ownership of them).  
However, Shabazz did not claim ownership of the bags at the time of arrest; nor did he 
claim by affidavit or present any evidence at the suppression hearing that the bags and 
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their contents were his.  Shabazz contends his ownership of and possessory interest in the 
bags is established by the agent’s hearing testimony that Shabazz was observed leaving 
the house with the bags and placing them in the trunk of the car.  We do not agree; 
evidence that Shabazz possessed the bags momentarily while he transported them from 
the house to the car is insufficient to meet his burden in establishing a privacy interest in 
the bags searched.  Shabazz fails to establish standing here. 
B.  Search Incident to Arrest  
 Shabazz also argues that the District Court erred in holding that the search and 
seizure of the bags was lawful as a search incident to arrest.  Shabazz first contends that 
there was no probable cause to arrest him, and thus, the evidence seized from the bags 
must be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree.  See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 
U.S. 471, 484-85 (1963) (requiring the suppression of evidence seized as a result of an 
unlawful arrest).  
It is well established that a search incident to a warrantless arrest is valid only if 
the arrest itself is valid.  United States v. Kithcart, 134 F.3d 529, 531 (3d Cir. 1998).  An 
arrest without a warrant is lawful if there is probable cause.  United States v. Watson, 423 
U.S. 411, 417 (1976).  Probable cause to arrest exists when a reasonable law enforcement 
officer has cause to believe than an offense has been committed and that the person being 
arrested committed that offense.  Orsatti v. N.J. State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 483 (3d Cir. 
1995); see also Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) (defining probable cause 
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as having a “reasonable ground for belief of guilt”).  The probable cause inquiry requires 
us to ask whether, at the moment of arrest, “the facts and circumstances [the agents had] 
within their knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were 
sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing [that Shabazz] had committed or was 
committing an offense.”  Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964).   
The FBI agents here had probable cause to arrest Shabazz for both the bank 
robbery and the planned home invasion.  Indeed, Shabazz concedes that the agents had 
“probable cause to arrest Shabazz if he could be identified.”  (Appellant Br. 13.)  In other 
words, Shabazz contends that there was not sufficient probable cause to establish that the 
passenger side occupant of the vehicle was indeed Shabazz.  Shabazz argues that, 
because the phone recordings had indicated that there would be three robbers, and two 
black men were observed exiting the house and only one entered Swerdon’s vehicle, 
agents could not have been sure that the man they were arresting was actually Shabazz.   
As the Supreme Court has noted, however, the standard for probable cause does 
not require certainty.  Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 246 (1983); see also Wilson v. 
Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 793 n.2 (3d Cir. 2000).  Moreover, courts must look at the “totality 
of the circumstances” and use “common sense” in evaluating the existence of probable 
cause.  United States v. Glasser, 750 F.2d 1197, 1205-06 (3d Cir. 1984).  Here, the agents 
had probable cause to believe that the passenger in Swerdon’s vehicle was indeed 
Shabazz.  Shabazz himself had indicated in the recorded phone conversations that he 
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would drive with Swerdon to Pennsylvania.  Additionally, at no point did Swerdon, who 
had cooperated fully with agents, indicate in any way that it was not Shabazz in the 
passenger seat. 
Shabazz next argues that the search incident to arrest was not valid because it was 
unreasonable to believe that the vehicle could contain evidence of the crime of arrest to 
justify the search.  “Police may search a vehicle incident to [arrest if] . . . it is reasonable 
to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.”  Arizona v. Gant, 556 
U.S. 332, 351 (2009).  Shabazz contends that, because nearly two months had passed 
between the bank robbery and the day of arrest, the agents could not reasonably believe 
that evidence of the bank robbery would be found.  We disagree.   
Swerdon had informed the agents that he had driven to pick Shabazz up from New 
York for the bank robbery in the same manner he was doing for the home invasion 
robbery.  The agents knew from witness testimony that guns, masks, and bags were used 
in the bank robbery.  They also had recorded conversations between Swerdon and 
Shabazz confirming that Shabazz intended to bring guns with him and had observed 
Shabazz placing bags in Swerdon’s car.  It was reasonable for the agents to believe that 
those bags might contain guns and other items used in the robbery two months prior.
3
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 Shabazz contends that Gant only permits a search incident to arrest when there is reason 
to believe that the vehicle contained evidence of the offense of arrest, and that the fact 
that he was charged only with the bank robbery evidences that he was arrested only for 
the bank robbery.  We believe Shabazz reads Gant too narrowly in light of subsequent 
Supreme Court jurisprudence.  See Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153-54 (2004) 
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We thus uphold the search and seizure of the bags as a lawful search incident to arrest as 
well.
4
   
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s denial of the 
Shabazz’s motion to suppress. 
                                                                                                                                                             
(holding that an arrest is valid under the Fourth Amendment if it is based on any offense 
for which police have probable cause, even if that offense is different from, and not 
closely related to, the offense stated by the police as the reason for the arrest).  But we 
need not resolve this issue here. 
 
4
 The Government also urges that we should affirm the admission of the bags and their 
contents into evidence under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.  See 
United States v. Burton, 288 F.3d 91, 100 (3d Cir. 2002).  Because we affirm on other 
grounds, we need not address this argument. 
